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Chapter 1
B u i l d i n g  C h i n a  a n d  t h e  M a k i n g  o f  
a  N e w  W o r k i n g  C l a s s
Of Cement and Cigarettes
Dan squats near the gate and takes a slow drag from his South Sea ciga­
rette. These cigarettes, called Zhongnanhai in Chinese, are named after an 
imperial garden next to the Communist Party headquarters. The name is 
rightfully earned, given that these are purported to have been Mao Zedong’s 
favorite cigarettes. When Dan exhales, the billow of smoke lingers in the hot, 
still Beijing air. Dan is from Hebei— a province that surrounds Beijing and 
a place where everyone seems to smoke South Sea cigarettes. He crushes the 
hot ash between his calloused, cement-caked fingers, rises slowly from squat­
ting position, and returns to work.
Dan spends most of his day bent over with his back facing the sun as he 
swings a shovel, m ixing and moving cement. In 2010, China used 57 percent 
of the global production of cement for less than 20 percent of the world’s pop­
ulation, and between 2008 and 2010, it used more cement than the United 
States used during the entire twentieth century (Smil 2013, 91). As Dan
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works, a fine dust fills his lungs and covers his body in a white-gray sheen. 
Sweat drips from his forehead into this textured material that is the key in­
gredient in building China.
Cement is used in both mortar and concrete: it is the glue that holds 
things together and the substance that gives most buildings their shape. 
Similarly, migrants like Dan are the glue and substance of Chinas modern 
cities. Like cement, they are ubiquitous yet easily overlooked. The estimated 
260 million migrant workers in China are concentrated in the cities, repre­
senting 25 percent of the population of Shanghai, 30 percent of Beijing, 
and 40 percent of Guangzhou. Like mortar, these migrants hold the cities 
together, doing all the menial jobs that make things hum: they are porters, 
food preparers and servers, domestic workers, nannies, cleaners, retail and 
street vendors, sanitation workers, and workers in manufacturing and, of 
course, construction.
These workers are also like mortar in that they connect the large cities of 
Chinas East Coast to the rest of the country. One can almost map the ori­
gins of workers on a jobsite based on the cigarettes they smoke. In addition 
to Dans favored brand, South Sea (Zhongnanhai), which indicates his home 
province, Hebei, a quick glance around the jobsite reveals workers smoking 
Pride (Jiaozi) from Sichuan, Double Happiness (Shuangxi) from Shanghai, 
Happy Cat (Haomao) from Shaanxi, Jade Creek (Yuxi) and Red Tower 
(Hongta Shan) from Yunnan, and Red Sand (Baisha) from Henan.
Just as migrant construction workers build China’s cities, so too are their 
lives built around their work in the cities. Dan is only nineteen. He did not 
go to high school, and like hundreds of millions of other migrant workers, 
he came to the city to follow his dreams and find his future. He has two ma­
jor life goals: to have a family and to become rich. He traveled to Beijing to 
acquire the “three keys” that are necessary to realize his dreams: a key to an 
office, a key to a house, and a key to a car. To reach his goals, Dan must first 
work his way into a good job (the key to an office); in construction, this means 
striking out on your own to become the boss or a contractor. Then, he will 
be able to afford a house and a car, or at least a motorcycle. Dan is from a 
poor family, and it is almost impossible to find a bride without something to 
offer; in China today, a groom is expected to bring the three keys to the table. 
How many shovelfuls of cement will it take for him to reach his goals?
This morning, Dan woke at 6:00 a.m. and was on the jobsite working by 
7:00 a.m. Along with millions of other migrants, he does this day after day,
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year after year. He sometimes hums a tune as he swings the shovel. In the 
cool morning hours, it is not uncommon to hear humming or songs through­
out the jobsite or to see smiles on workers’ faces. By midmorning, breaks for 
cigarettes and water are a part of the rhythm, breaking the monotony of mix­
ing, shoveling, and hauling. Inhaled smoke, coupled with small sips of warm 
water, provides relief from the alkaline dust. It also gives the body a mo­
ment to rest, the mind a moment to wander, and the spirit a moment to re­
cover.
Like the concrete used in the buildings, these migrants give cities their 
form. In doing so, they become part of the cities they build. Dan has worked 
in Beijing for almost two years but has saved little money. I look over at 
Anlin, who is also smoking a South Sea cigarette. He is fifty years old, and 
his back is permanently hunched from years of lifting and bending as he 
works piles of cement. His hands are coarse, his face and back are darkened 
from long days in Beijing’s unrelenting sun, his arms are scarred by acci­
dents, and his body is gaunt from arduous work with minimal food. He 
doesn’t return home anymore; his wife left, and his children grew up with­
out him as he worked year after year in cities chasing his dreams. Cigarettes 
and cement, like the songs of the Sirens, lure many migrant workers away 
from home and down this path.1 They offer the irresistible promise of a 
“Chinese Dream,” but like the sailors trying to reach the Sirens, the workers 
are destroyed in the process of trying to realize that dream.2
Dan and Anlin are part of the growing number of informal precarious 
workers who are building a new, modern China. In the process, these workers 
are not only erecting concrete buildings and changing the cities but also re­
shaping China’s working class.
Constructing China: Urbanization, Migration, 
and Informalization
Historically, the process of building cities has been a people-driven response 
to demographic shifts. As people move into cities, buildings and structures 
are built to accommodate them, which is how most cities grow.3 However, 
the current historical period has witnessed a shift in the process of urban­
ization from people-driven to capital-driven. In cities characterized by 
capital-driven growth, capital investment has moved from manufacturing
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and production into building and real estate (Harvey 1985). Construction be­
comes a strategy of capital accumulation, changing from providing a means 
to an end to becoming an end in itself.
China is the paradigmatic example of this process. Urbanization is the cor­
nerstone of Chinas modernization project and a driving force behind the 
nations economic growth. In places like India and Africa, urban land ex­
pansion is driven by urban population growth. By contrast, in China it is 
driven more by growth in the per capita gross domestic product (GDP), which 
accounted for almost half of Chinas urban land expansion between 1970 
and 2000 (Seto et al. 2011). Accordingly, Chinas construction industry expe­
rienced a spectacular annual average growth rate of 22 percent from 2001 to 
2008 (Huang, Lan, and Bai 2013), representing about one-fourth (US$1.4 tril­
lion) of China’s GDP (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2010). Re­
cently, its output value has surpassed that of the construction industry in the 
United States, making it the largest in the world. China is projected to ac­
count for about one-fifth of the global construction industry within the next 
decade (Ai-ju 2011).
This massive building spree is literally and figuratively remaking China. 
It is restructuring space as some of the world’s longest bridges, tallest build­
ings, largest dams, and most expansive manufacturing facilities spring up 
across the landscape. An important part of this restructuring involves the 
movement of people, as hundreds of millions of migrants leave rural areas 
for growing cities. By the end of 2011, over 50 percent of China’s 1 billion 
people lived in urban areas, many of them large cities. There are 160 cities 
with more than 1 million people; four of these have more than 10 million, 
and two megacities, Shanghai and Guangzhou, have more than 20 million.4
The process of building China is also (re)making its working class. The 
workers who build and serve the cities, along with those who produce goods 
for the world to consume, are mostly migrant workers.5 They, or their par­
ents, grew up in the countryside; they are farmers who left the fields and mi­
grated to the cities to find work. In China, migration is regulated by the 
huhpu system. This system involves an internal passport that, among other 
functions, restricts mobility and requires that migrants register in their new 
location, even if it is a temporary one. However, many migrants do not reg­
ister. These unregistered migrants are sim ilar to illegal migrants in other 
countries in that they have no access to social welfare or public goods, and as 
unregistered residents, they technically have no right to be in the city.6 One
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estimate suggests that unregistered migrants make up roughly 12 percent 
of the urban population (X. Wu 2005); another study reveals that in many of 
the larger cities of the East Coast, more than half the migrants are unregis­
tered (FL. Wang 2005, 78).
Most unregistered migrants end up working in precarious jobs in the in­
formal economy.7 Informal work includes jobs that pay wages but do not 
conform to labor laws and regulations, along with self-employment in busi­
nesses that are not registered with the state (Williams and Windeband 1998).8 
In China, the informal sector has evolved in tandem with economic marketi- 
zation, urbanization, and integration into the global economy. Informal 
employment has grown from 15,000 workers in 1978, when economic reforms 
began, to more than 168 million in 2006, now representing over 60 percent 
of total urban employment (P. Huang 2009). Migrant workers perform most 
of the informal work.9 It is concentrated in specific industries, including the 
construction and service industries, and specific occupations, including street 
vending, domestic work, child care, and recycling.
Examining the construction industry provides us with an understanding 
how the forces of urbanization, migration, and informalization are reshap­
ing both China and its workforce. This industry involves one-third to one- 
half of all m igrant workers and is the number-one industry hiring male 
migrants.10 Informal employment in construction has grown from roughly 
17 percent in 1999 to an estimated 70 percent in 2008 (Wells and Jason 2010; 
Lu and Fox 2001). In sum, the construction industry is an important sector 
representing informal precarious work in urban China.
Moving beyond the Fagade: Uncovering and 
Understanding Informal Work in China
In an effort to understand the dynamics of informal work in China’s con­
struction industry, I immersed myself in the everyday life and work of male 
migrant construction workers for almost a year in 2004—5, followed by three 
shorter follow-up visits between 2008 and 2012. During this time, I gathered 
data from four types of research sites: enclaves including the one where I lived; 
construction jobsites including those where I worked; street labor markets; 
and governmental and nongovernmental organizations that serve migrant 
workers in Beijing and Guangzhou. The process of choosing sites and gaining
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access was complex and required a multipronged approach, which is de­
tailed in appendix A. This ethnographic method allowed me to explore 
some of the processes that shape this large and growing informal precarious 
workforce. It produced a rich tapestry of data that provide a unique lens into 
their everyday lives, work, and existence in the cities.
Most of my effort focused on construction workers. I spent most of my 
time on construction sites in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou (see appen­
dix B).11 In total, I interviewed 130 people: 83 people in 2004-5; 24 interviews 
in 2009; and 23 interviews in 2012 (see appendix C).12 These interview data 
are supplemented by field notes and journals that include observations and 
insights gained from participating in the lives of workers in the enclaves and 
on the jobsites.13 During the data collection process in Beijing, I mapped out 
informal employment in the industry, developed the concept of “employment 
configuration,” and identified three different employment configurations. I 
continued data collection until saturation was reached, meaning that new in­
terviews and observations were not yielding significant new insights or data.
I then decided to collect data in both Shanghai and Guangzhou in an effort 
to determine whether Beijing was a unique case or if it resembled other 
cities. I found that the three employment configurations existed in the con­
struction industry in all three cities, but the prominence of each varied across 
these places. Since the main purpose of this book is to define and describe 
employment configurations in the industry, I draw mostly from the rich data 
accumulated from research in Beijing, and then, in the final chapter, I dis­
cuss similarities and differences across the cities and how they can inform 
future research.
This book makes three main contributions to our understanding of in­
formal work in China. First, it documents diversity in employment relations 
and the labor market. This diversity exists in spite of the fact that all of these 
workers are similar: they are all men who are unregistered migrants work­
ing informally in the construction industry in major cities in China. This 
book helps us make sense of that diversity and the diversity of informal pre­
carious work more generally. Second, it expands our understanding of 
China’s emerging labor regime, which is central to labor control, intimately 
related to the urbanization process, and ultimately linked to China’s over­
all economic success. Finally, it shows how these migrants struggle against 
the disciplining process, contest exploitation, and protest in unique ways. 
Just as with other workers toiling under capitalism, important structural
Building China and the Maying o f  a New Wording Class 7
forces shape their work and lives but are not deterministic. Thus, this large, 
emerging segment of workers should not be overlooked when analyzing the 
complexities of class and class politics in China.
Mapping out Diversity of Informal Work:
Employment Configurations
The diversity of employment arrangements and working conditions that I 
found among these informal precarious workers is surprising because the 
scholarship tends to focus, explicitly and implicitly, on the difference between 
the categories of formal and informal work. As Williams and Lansky’s (2013) 
review of the literature reveals, informal employment is either framed in op­
position to formal employment, or it is defined in terms of what it is not. In 
the absence of a strong definition, formal work is seen as standard employ­
ment offering decent pay and good working conditions, and informal work 
is seen as nonstandard employment characterized by low wages, poor work­
ing conditions, and harsh labor control regimes (Castells and Portes 1989; 
Sassen 1994).14 However, the boundaries between formal and informal em­
ployment have become blurrier as standard employment relations unravel 
across the globe and are replaced by increasingly precarious employment 
arrangements such as contingent, contract, temporary, and part-time work 
(Carre 2000; Kalleberg 2000).15 Studies documenting precarious employ­
ment arrangements reveal the growing diversity of these arrangements and 
the increasing number of people in the flexible labor force that feed the 
global economy. Yet the scholarship remains focused on formal (precari­
ous) work arrangements, leaving informal workers mostly hidden (Vosko, 
MacDonald, and Campbell 2009). This is despite the fact that informal 
workers represent anywhere from 20 to 90 percent of nonagricultural em­
ployment (Gottfried 2013) and constitute the largest sector of the worldwide 
labor market (Agarwala 2009).
Informal workers are being pulled “out of the shadows” and recognized 
as an increasingly important segment of the working class in both developed 
and developing countries (Fernändez-Kelly and Shefner 2006).16 We know 
that they are concentrated in key occupations and industries as street ven­
dors (Cross 1998a), domestic workers (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001), waste pickers 
(Medina 2008), day laborers (Valenzuela 2003), and home-based workers
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(Kantor 2003).17 Scholars have also identified important differences between 
informal self-employment, also referred to as “own account” work, and in­
formal wage employment (W illiams 2013). These nuanced studies and the 
insights they provide into informal work and labor politics do not go far 
enough to differentiate this huge segment of the workforce. In part, lim ita­
tions are the result of an industrial labor relations framework that largely ex­
cludes informal workers and their employment situations from our analysis 
(M. Chen and Vanek 2013).
One of the most intractable issues in research on informal employment 
arises from the concept of the “employment relationship,” a legal category 
that by definition excludes informal work. The International Labour Orga­
nization (ILO) states: “The employment relationship is the legal link between 
employers and employees. It exists when a person performs work or services 
under certain conditions in return for remuneration.”18 As a result, labor laws 
create categories offo rm a l precarious work (e.g., temporary, contracted, or 
part-time), and informal work remains undifferentiated. This framing also 
implicitly distinguishes between formal work as regulated and informal work 
as unregulated. This book challenges that assumption by showing that in­
formal work, despite being outside the law, is indeed regulated, albeit in 
different ways.
Another limiting aspect of this framework is related to labor market mod­
els (M. Chen and Vanek 2013). Most scholarship on labor markets places 
formal work in the center and treats the informal market as a residue of a 
previous primitive form of capitalism or a cheaper substitute to formal em­
ployment (W illiams and Round 2008). Informal workers are theorized as 
forced into informal work by exclusion from the formal economy or as choos­
ing to exit the formal economy and voluntarily enter informal work because 
it offers desirable alternatives for workers and businesses and owners who 
are strangled by regulations (Perry et al. 2007). This framing focuses atten­
tion on the related “good/bad” job dichotomy and obscures the diversity of 
arrangements within and across the formal/informal divide.
In an effort to bring informal work back into our framework, overcome 
existing definitional and conceptual limitations, and make sense of the em­
pirical diversity of employment arrangements, I have developed a new con­
cept: “employment configuration ” An em ploym en t configuration is defin ed as 
a sp ecific pathway into em ploym ent lin\ed with a sp ecific m echanism  that regu ­
lates the em ploym ent relationship. The term “pathways into employment” di-
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rects our attention to how informal workers find their jobs rather than on 
how they enter the informal economy, allowing us to unpack diversity in the 
labor market on the informal side of the formal/informal binary. Further­
more, identifying and naming the mechanisms that regulate the employment 
relationship moves beyond the legalistic definition to recognize that extrale­
gal mechanisms also shape employment relationships. Finally, the term “em­
ployment configuration” links how workers find their jobs and how their 
employment relationships are regulated.
My ethnographic work in China’s construction industry reveals clusters 
of experiences, which are grouped together into three distinct employment 
configurations among informal migrant workers (see table 1.1). In some cases, 
workers find jobs through large labor contractors with whom they do not 
have a direct link through social networks. In these cases, the employment 
relationship is established, mediated, and regulated through a contract labor 
system based on a standardized, widespread, yet informal agreement. The 
resulting employment configuration is called mediated employm ent. Work­
ers who use their social ties to find work operate under a configuration of 
em bedded em ploym ent, where their employment relationships are embedded 
in and regulated through social networks. Finally, workers who find em­
ployment through street labor markets face despotic employment relations
Table 1.1. Summary of employment configurations
Employment
configuration
Labor m arket (pathway 
into employment)
Employment relations 
(mechanism o f regulation)
M ediated • W orkers use large labor M e d i a t e d  and regulated by contractors
contractors to find jobs 
•  R ural labor m arket
and contracted labor system
Em bedded • W orkers use social E m b e d d e d  in social netw orks and
netw orks to find jobs 
•  R ural and u rban  labor 
m arket
regulated by these netw orks
Individualized • W orkers use street labor I n d i v i d u a l l y  subordinated to
m arkets to find jobs unadulterated m arket forces and
• U rban  labor m arket regulated m ainly by violence or 
threat o f violence
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rooted in unequal power relations due to unchecked market forces. Employ­
ment relations in this case are mainly regulated through violence or the 
threat of violence, in what I label individualized employm ent.
I uncovered only three types of employment configurations among infor­
mal workers in the construction industry, but there may be more, especially 
if we include formal work. The number and types of configurations may also 
vary across construction industries in different countries or across different 
industries within a country. Exploring these possibilities will require addi­
tional research and comparative work.
The chapters to follow provide rich details that flesh out these definitions. 
They analyze the diversity of work situations experienced by these informal 
workers and show how most workers enter into and remain within one spe­
cific employment configuration. The focus on diversity within informal work 
rather than across the formal/informal divide (Nee, Sanders, and Sernau 
1994) helps us understand why some workers are extremely mobile and others 
much less so. It also sheds light on how and why social networks operate dif­
ferently among different groups of informal workers, in some cases operating 
as important tools for recruitment (Pun and Lu 2010), and in other cases, as 
a burden avoided by contractors (Menjivar 2000; Guang 2005). In sum, the 
concept of employment configuration is robust in that it offers additional 
analytical leverage and captures a broader range of employment relations, ex­
panding our framework to include informal workers.
China’s Labor Regime and the Spatial Politics of 
Production and Social Reproduction
China’s integration into the global economy is characterized by a production 
system and a labor regime that successfully competes against, and in many 
ways out performs, flexible production and traditional Fordism. I argue that 
this success is, in part, based on the creation of a low-cost precarious work­
force accomplished through spatially merging and separating (1) production, 
(2) daily reproduction, and (3) social reproduction of labor in ways that lower 
the daily costs of labor reproduction and eliminate the need for employers to 
pay a wage that can reproduce labor.19
As China’s economy has grown, China’s workers have received a shrink­
ing piece of the expanding economic pie. Labor’s share of the GDP has de-
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dined from 53 percent in 1990 to 39.7 percent in 2007 (Li 2007). This stands 
in stark contrast to most other countries, where labor’s share of GDP usu­
ally ranges from 60 to 80 percent (Li 2007). This is possible because China’s 
market economy has unique features that make it different from Western 
capitalism and different from capitalism in East Asia. One of the unique fea­
tures of “capitalism with Chinese characteristics” is the “grabbing hand of 
the state,” which works with capital to disenfranchise both peasants and 
workers (Y. Huang 2008,283). One way that this happens is by spatially merg­
ing and separating production, daily reproduction and social reproduction 
of labor in ways that create precarious workers both on and off the jobsite 
and lower the overall costs of labor.
China’s entrance into the global economy and the emergence of a new 
labor regime has included a protracted process of unmaking the “old” in­
dustrial working class while simultaneously making a new industrial work­
ing class (Lee 2007). The old industrial working class, shaped during the 
Maoist period, worked under a labor regime characterized by a socialist 
social compact anchored by the danwei system. In this labor regime, produc­
tion and social reproduction of labor were merged as state-owned enterprises 
not only provided jobs but also meted out housing, health care, education, 
retirement, and access to cultural events. During the period of economic 
restructuring, which peaked between 1995 and 2001, employment in state- 
owned enterprises dropped from 113 million to 67 million (Giles, Park, and 
Cai 2006). Those who remain employed face precarity as their labor has be­
come commodified through a smashing of the “iron rice bowl” and the 
separation of production from social reproduction of labor. Their employ­
ment is now girded by new labor law based on “the market-oriented, volun­
taristic and individualistic ‘labor contract’ ” (Friedman and Lee 2010, 509).
At the same time, a new industrial working class and an associated labor 
regime are emerging as the combination of global capitalism and altered leg­
acies of socialism draws peasants from the fields into the factories and com­
modifies their labor under a dormitory labor system operating within this 
new legal labor regime.20 The dormitory labor system produces a large per­
manently young, predominately female, temporary workforce that feeds the 
export-oriented manufacturing industry in South China (Pun 2007). Produc­
tion and social reproduction are spatially configured quite differently from 
the old state-owned enterprise sector. In this sector, the state is also a central 
actor as production and social reproduction are spatially separated through
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institutions such as thzhukpu system, under which most peasants who move 
to the cities become temporary migrant workers. These temporary migrants 
work in the cities (production), but their access to social services, welfare, and 
public goods remains tied to their hometowns (social reproduction).
On another level, employers are central actors as they (re)structure em­
ployment to merge and/or to reconfigure production and daily reproduction 
under the dormitory labor regime in ways that benefit capital. This is done 
by cramming dozens of workers into single rooms, opting for low-quality 
food prepared in vast quantities, and elim inating the need for transporta­
tion. These arrangements also allow employers to extend their control over 
work and free time, which increases exploitation and working time and fa­
cilitates just-in-time flexible production practices (Pun and Smith 2007). The 
dormitory system, in conjunction with state policies, such as those mentioned 
above, shifts social reproductive costs back to rural areas. This is accomplished 
by hiring and housing only young single women, or individuals, rather than 
families.21 In many cases, these arrangements require women to return to 
their hometown to marry and have children, and then, if they resume work, 
their children must be left behind to be cared for by relatives or grand­
parents (Murphy 2002). In creating these new industrial workers, one pro­
cess spatially merges production and daily reproduction, and the second 
spatially separates production and social reproduction of labor. Taken to­
gether, they lower the daily costs of labor reproduction and eliminate the 
need for a wage that can reproduce labor.
The concept of em p loym en t con figura tion  deepens our understanding 
of China’s emerging labor regime by expanding beyond factory workers 
to include informal workers in the analysis. These informal workers are not 
toiling under a disintegrating socialist social compact or under the newly 
emerging legal regime accompanied by a dormitory labor system. Informal 
workers face a different set of constraints, and as the three employment con­
figurations outlined in this book capture, there are multiple ways that pro­
duction, daily reproduction, and generational or social reproduction are 
merged or reconfigured.
Mediated employment represents a gendered variant of the dormitory 
labor regime found in factories: one produces a cheap, predominately male, 
long-term but flexible workforce, and the other creates a young, predominately 
female, short-term flexible workforce. At the same time, both undermine 
families as they compel workers to migrate as “individuals” rather than as
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members of families. The costs of generational social reproduction is pushed 
onto extended family and hometown communities as production, which oc­
curs in the urban areas, is spatially separated from social reproduction, which 
is carried out in the rural areas, or is eliminated.
The second employment configuration, embedded employment, offers 
an example of how production and social reproduction of labor can be merged 
in a qualitatively different way. In this employment configuration, produc­
tion and daily reproduction are separated, but for the most part, both pro­
duction and social reproduction occur in the cities. Migrants working in 
embedded employment are dating, getting married, setting up homes, get­
ting pregnant, having children and, in some cases even raising children and 
retiring in the cities. This is not to deny their tenuous existence, or that some 
aspects of social reproduction are still forced back to the rural areas. How­
ever, this spatial re-uniting of production and social production in the cities 
creates dense social networks and helps these migrant workers develop 
social capital in the cities. As a result, social networks play an important role 
in creating an informal safety net and shape work relationships as mecha­
nisms that emanate out of these social networks regulate employment and 
control the labor process. In the third employment configuration, individu­
alized employment, social reproduction is effectively eliminated and daily re­
production is precarious as workers just struggle to survive.
The concept of employment configurations also captures how Chinas 
emerging labor regime not only lowers labor costs through rearranging the 
relationship between production and social reproduction but also lowers costs 
through increasing the precariousness that workers face both on and off the 
job. The spatial (re)arrangements of production and social reproduction 
under each employment configuration influence how migrants are integrated 
into cities and reshape relationships with their hometowns. As a result, life 
in the cities is experienced differently for migrants depending on their em­
ployment configuration: those in mediated employment live in a city of walls; 
those working in embedded employment live in a city of villages; and those 
in individualized employment live in a “city of violence.” It also changes their 
migratory patterns and relations with hometowns. Workers who live on job­
sites year after year in a “city of walls” become disconnected from their 
hometowns but do not become integrated into the cities; workers who live in 
a “city of villages” become tenuous settlers because of their lack of rights; and 
workers who live in a “city of violence” tend to be highly mobile, “floating”
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from city to city trying to evade trouble and find work. These different mi­
gratory patterns help explain why, in some cases, their connection to their 
hometown and the land continues to provide a kind of safety net, while in 
other cases, this link is more or less severed.
Finally, as we will see, the spatial merging and reconfigurations of pro­
duction, daily reproduction, and social reproduction intensifies not only work 
and work control but also shapes conflict and protest among workers and 
between workers and employers.
Informal Workers, Class Politics, and Protest
The third and final major finding of this study is that these informal work­
ers, while constrained by their employment configuration, are not rendered 
powerless, unorganizable, or impotent in terms of protest. In fact, protests 
actions range from everyday acts of resistance to participation in organized 
protests and formal organizations. They vary in targets and strategies; some 
utilize authorized channels and engage in tolerated protest behavior, and 
others push the boundaries. These protests and struggles, which are part of 
the developing dynamics of class politics in China, can only be understood 
in the context of the changing spatial organization of production and social 
reproduction under globalization within this specific national context.
Scholars have used the concept of labor regime to link the regulation of 
labor and the social reproduction of labor and show how it influences the 
form of labor protest and struggle (Lee 200; Buroway 1985).22 As a result, 
we know a good deal about class politics and protests among China’s indus­
trial workers, but we know much less about class politics and protest among 
informal workers in China. The “old” industrial workers created out of Mao’s 
Communist Revolution engage in “protests of desperation” as the social com­
pact underpinning the arrangements in their work and lives disintegrates 
(Solinger 1999; Hurst 2004; Lee 2007). At the same time, “new” industrial 
workers are created as peasants leave the fields and enter the factories. In the 
process of becoming workers and citizens of the city, they engage in “pro­
tests against discrimination,” which have gained legitimacy through the new 
regulatory labor regime (Lee 2007). The variation in the form of protests 
among these workers is attributed to the different labor regimes, and spe­
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cifically to the “diverse modes of state regulation of labor and the system of 
social provision outside of waged work” (12).
However, industrial factory workers, both old and new, represent only a 
relatively small segment of the overall working population, and even at their 
peak in the mid- to late 1990s, they represented less than 15 percent of all 
workers in China (Evans and Staveteig 2009).23 In contrast, other segments 
of the working class, such as those in the service sector and informal sector, 
are much larger and growing faster. This book expands our understanding 
of China’s emerging labor regime by mapping out informal work and de­
veloping the concept of employment cofiguration, it then uses this concep­
tual map to help us understand struggles and protests by informal workers.
I use the concept of employment configuration instead of labor regime 
because it allows me to add a spatial analysis. The concept of employment 
configuration captures the diverse modes of regulation of informal work and 
how they are linked to different kinds of social provisions outside of waged 
work, but then nests this within a macro analysis of the production of urban 
space; and just as with formal work, it is then used to help us explain different 
kinds of protests. As such, protests among workers in mediated employment 
share similarities with migrant factory workers toiling under the dormitory 
labor regime; whereas protests among construction workers in embedded 
employment are more similarities with those of the laid-off factory workers 
in North China.
Protests among informal workers in mediated employment are somewhat 
similar to “protests of discrimination” by migrant factory workers described 
by Lee (2007), in that the main grievances are about wages and insurgent 
identities linked to exploitation and discrimination. At the same time, these 
workers in mediated employment are informal, without contracts or access to 
the law, so their protests do not include legal mobilization. They turn to col­
lective protests which are different from factory workers in that they are not 
garnering structural power from their position in the economic system nor are 
they amassing associational power from an organizing into a union or labor 
organization. Instead, their protests take the form of “public dramas” which 
draw attention to their plight and gain support through claims-making that 
appeals to cultural values and moral norms, creating symbolic power.
In contrast, protests among informal workers in embedded employment 
are “protest of disruption” and in some ways look like “protests of desperation”
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by factory workers in state-owned enterprises under the disappearing so­
cialist contract (Lee 2007). In both cases, workers take to the streets and 
cause public disruptions that interrupt normal function of society. In both 
cases, their grievances are not related to their own work but rather are cen­
tered on issues of citizenship, broadly defined. However, an important dif­
ference is that the protests that these informal workers participate in are 
outside of the routinized contentious bargaining that has become a hallmark 
of China’s authoritarianism (Chen 2011). For informal workers in embedded 
employment, their work and lives are intimately connected to both the city 
and their hometowns. Social reproduction of labor takes place not only in the 
city, where these workers live their lives, but in some ways it is also forced 
back to their hometowns, where their citizenship and social rights remain.24 
It is in this context that the contradictions of living in the city while lacking 
citizenship and the right to be a part of the city creates a tenuous existence 
which becomes salient and leads them to participate in “protests of disrup­
tion.” Finally, in individualized employment, worker ties to family and 
community are severed, and both production and social reproduction are 
precarious. In these conditions, and in the face of a despotic labor regime, 
these workers still carry out everyday forms of resistance but rarely partici­
pate in collective action as workers or as citizens.25
This book also adds to our understanding of informal workers’ resistance 
and class politics and protest by providing a case study of resistance among 
informal workers toiling under an authoritarian state where basic labor rights 
are not recognized. The few studies on organizing and protests among in­
formal workers in China are pessimistic. Lee and Shen (2011) suggest that 
in China’s political context, collaboration between informal migrant work­
ers and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) results in antisolidaristic 
tendencies rather than collective power and action. Pun and Lu (2010) ex­
amine collective action among construction workers and argue that the con­
struction industry does not present a “normal” employment relationship 
because there is “no boss, no employer directly responsible for employment 
practices.” As a result, “the exceptional practices involved in the rapidly 
changing construction industry induce angry, largely impotent collective ac­
tions by construction workers” (158). However, as Cho (2013) suggests in her 
study of laid-off workers, it may be helpful to move beyond defining worker 
resistance in term of class struggle based on the relation of production, and 
if we can do so, “what we witness in China is not the absence or incomplete-
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ness of resistance but a different style of resistance” (6).26 This is important 
given that informal workers in China, like in many other areas of the world, 
tend not to join unions or use the strike and traditional protest forms that 
are popular with the formal industrial working class.
There are multiple reasons why these workers, especially informal workers, 
do not join unions or participate in typical forms of labor protest. First, they 
are generally seen as weak and unorganizable, and their protests are 
deemed impotent. They are considered difficult to organize because they are 
not protected by labor laws. They are also poor, underprivileged, without 
clear or defined employers, and change jobs frequently (Jhabvala 2013). All 
these factors lead to workers who are “widely dispersed, disconnected, and 
unregulated,” creating a fragmented and heterogeneous workforce that poses 
challenges to collective solidarity and organizing (K. M. Roberts 2002, 22). 
Furthermore, many informal workers feel that unions and other formal 
labor organizations are not a good fit because informal workers often lack 
the legal standing necessary to pursue legal action used by unions, and their 
needs differ from those of traditional workers (Jhabvala 2013; Wells and 
Jason 2010). Also, unions are often not serious about organizing informal 
workers, ignoring them or denying them a voice (Chinguno 2010; L iu 2010). 
As a result, informal workers do not turn to traditional mobilization strategies 
and institutions. In fact, Agarwala suggests that these traditional forms of or­
ganizing and protest are not widespread among informal or formal workers.
For decades, industrialized workers fought to enter into an institutional struc­
ture that provided some play for collective interests; this institutional struc­
ture formalized workers’ identities and status through legislation designed to 
protect them against employer exploitation. Their efforts, while laudable, have 
affected only a minority of the world’s workers. Now, due to the industrial 
restructuring of the 1980s and 1990s, even the small global share of formally 
protected workers is diminishing. These changes have brought scholarship of 
labor movements to a critical juncture by questioning traditional mobiliza­
tion strategies and institutions that rely on formal state protections and em­
ployer accountability. (2008, 377)
In contrast to formal workers, informal workers create a wide range of or­
ganizations beyond traditional unions, including worker cooperatives such as 
those created by waste pickers in Brazil (Medina 2008); worker associations
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such as the Self-Employed Workers Association (SEWA) organized by women 
in India (Kapoor 2007); worker centers like those established by day laborers in 
the United States (Fine 2006); and nontraditional unions such as the associated 
unions organized by street vendors in Mozambique (Schurman et al. 2013).
Informal workers are also more likely to target the state than employers 
(Chun 2009; Agarwala 2008), and although they struggle with class-based is­
sues, they often make claims using the rhetoric of citizenship or human rights 
(Agarwala 2008; M ilkman 2011). Finally, sometimes informal workers en­
gage in individual or quiet collective acts of resistance (Tripp 1997; Cross 
1998b; Whitson 2007), and at other times they turn to more dramatic forms of 
collective action (Kudva 2009; Bayat 1997; Milkman and Wong 2000). I argue 
that their struggles, protests, and organizing, far from being impotent or 
ineffective, play an important role in emerging class politics in China.
In sum, there are at least three important segments of China’s emerging 
working class, each with unique characteristics. The factory workers in the 
Rustbelt are part of the working class but are not proletarians in the Marx­
ian sense, in that they were simultaneously workers and owners of the 
means of production under the socialist system (Wälder 1984). The mi­
grants in the Sunbelt who work in factories owned by global capital do not 
yet constitute a class; instead, they are a class in the making (K. Chan and 
Ngai 2009). Finally, these informal workers are part of the precariat and 
should also be included in our analysis of Chinas emerging working class.
China’s emerging labor regime represents a fragmented working class 
but that does not make it passive or impotent. W hile factory workers par­
ticipate in protests of desperation and protests of discrimination, informal 
workers participate in protests using public dramas and protests of disrup­
tion. Although their protest and struggle differ from those of traditional 
workers, these informal workers challenge the power of global capital, con­
front state repression, and restore dignity to peasants finding their place in 
the urban economy. These struggles make their journeys out of the fields 
and into cities less fatalistic and earn them an important place in history.
Outline of the Book
Chapter 2 presents important background information about China’s hukpu 
system, migration patterns, and construction industry. A brief overview of
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the system, how it has changed, and what it looks like today is followed by a 
categorization of the types of migrants based on citizenship rights and a sum­
mary of the changes in migration laws and patterns over time. The chapter 
closes with a more detailed look at the construction industry and how its reor­
ganization during the reform period allowed it to absorb a significant por­
tion of the new migrant workforce.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 use empirical data to describe the three employment 
configurations that characterize informal work in the construction industry. 
Each chapter introduces the employment configuration, defines the labor mar­
ket (pathway into employment) and identifies the main mechanisms of regu­
lation. The chapters then describe the links between patterns of entrance into 
employment and how employers regulate their labor. These chapters also show 
how employment configurations shape migrant workers’ spatial integration 
into the cities and their migratory patterns. Chapter 3 details mediated em ploy­
m en t, the contracted-labor system on which it is based, and the intricate rela­
tionship between this employment configuration and the rural-urban divide. 
Chapter 4 outlines em bedded em ploym ent with a focus on the different kinds 
of social networks that shape this pathway into employment and related mech­
anisms regulating this employment such as kinship obligation and bounded 
solidarity. Chapter 5 presents individualized employm ent, showing that it is the 
most exploitative form of employment, in many ways similar to unfree labor. 
This employment configuration is characterized by high rates of nonpayment 
of wages and the use of violence or threat of violence to regulate employment.
Chapter 6 looks at how these informal workers organize and protest 
despite the fact that they are often considered unorganizable. It shows how 
historical contingency alongside specific employment configurations shape 
protests, explaining why organizing and protest activities take the form of 
daily collective resistance punctuated by explosive collective action. It does 
this by presenting and analyzing some of the more salient issues for infor­
mal workers in construction, such as nonpayment of wages (wage theft) and 
right to livelihood; the former is usually considered a workers’ issue, and the 
latter is often defined as a citizenship issue. However, these lines are blurred 
among informal workers for whom work and living spaces are merged. The 
production of space and the organization of both production and social re­
production structure the politics of informal employment.
The closing chapter compares the contours and content of precarious work 
and precarious existence across the three employment configurations. It
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considers how these configurations compare to notable employment ar­
rangements in different places and industries across the globe. The chapter 
concludes by exploring how protests among informal workers are similar to 
and different from protests among other kinds of workers. These informal 
workers— who represent a large segment of the emerging workforce— do 
not fit the traditional model of an industrial wage worker and are not being 
incorporated into a new legal framework under China’s decentralized 
legal-authoritarian regime. This may lead some to consider this segment of 
China’s new proletariat as the “precariat,” an emergent social force based on 
vulnerability, insecurity, and uncertainty (Standing 2011). However, this pre­
carious informal workforce is not a “new class” in that it was also a prevalent 
segment of the working class in China before the Communist revolution. It 
has reemerged as a central component of China’s economic success, and in 
turn, an important source of labor resistance.
Chapter 2
T h e  H ukou S y s t e m , M ig r a t io n , 
and  t h e  C o n st r u c t io n  I n d u str y
The monumental rise of migrant labor in China is shaped by China s 
hukpu system, which operates as an internal passport system that links citi­
zenship rights and welfare benefits to birthplace (Solinger 1999; Chan and 
Zhang 1999). Daring Mao’s time, the system assigned three identifiers to every 
citizen at birth: (1) hukpu status as agricultural or nonagricultural; (2) a 
home place designated as rural or urban; and (3) an identification number. 
Hukpu status and home place both are inherited from one’s parents. For ex­
ample, if a child is born in Beijing, but her parents’ hukpu registration is in 
Shandong, the child’s hukpu registration will also be in Shandong. Similarly, 
if the parent’s hukpu status is agricultural, the child’s status will be agricul­
tural.1 Citizenship rights, including access to social welfare benefits, were 
based on status and linked to place of registration; however, over time, ac­
cess to rights under China’s hukou system has become varied and complex.
The hukpu system is a central institution shaping Chinese society. It is 
“among the oldest, longest-lasting political institutions dating back 25 cen­
turies” (FL. Wang 2005). Contradictions and complexities are an artifact of
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its long history. During different historical periods, the hu^ou system has been 
used for economic planning and resource allocation, central planning, taxa­
tion, control, mobility restriction, discipline, population control, and land 
policy. The system has followed maternal lines at some times and paternal 
lines at others. In some periods, the hu\ou system was disassociated from 
birthplace and instead linked with current residence.
The hu\ou system took on the form of modern legislation during the 
Kuomintang (KMT) government of the early twentieth century (FL. Wang 
2005) and was solidified during the Maoist era under the Communist Party 
(CCP). The CCP had three main goals in implementing and modifying the 
huhpu system. First, to root out state enemies, the hukpu system included a 
special ku\ou class for those suspected of disloyalty, allowing authorities to 
keep track of these people. Second, the hu\ou system played a major role in 
the implementation of collectivization through food rationing and the 
subsidy system put into place in the mid-1950s. The CCP linked hu\ou reg­
istration to the distribution of public goods and social services including hous­
ing, child care, schooling, and medical care (Feng 1997). These were also 
linked to the state labor bureau’s system for assigning employment positions 
(Guang 2001). Third, the huhpu system limited and controlled the movement 
of people. Despite significant disparities in the level and quality of social ser­
vices and employment opportunities between rural and urban areas, indi­
viduals had few opportunities for physical relocation apart from state-directed 
movement (Cheng and Seiden 1994).
All of these aspects of the hu\ou system contributed to the emergence of 
a central feature of life in China during the Maoist era: China’s bifurcated 
class society across the rural/urban divide. As one scholar notes: “Household 
registration, at the core of a whole set of institutional mechanisms control­
ling food, housing, work and travel, enabled a differential treatment of people 
according to whether their place of birth and residence was rural or urban. 
From then on peasants were treated as second-class citizens, despite the 
Maoist rhetoric on peasant values” (Florence 2004, 43).
The main mechanism through which this differential treatment occurs 
is government control over and redistribution of resources. The CCP consis­
tently allocates more and better resources to urban areas (Cheng and Seiden 
1994). As a result, urban residents have access to higher-quality schools, health 
care, jobs, and food. They also have access to better infrastructure such as 
public transportation, roads, sports and entertainment facilities, airports,
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water and sewage systems, and electricity. In Maoist China, the hu\ou pol­
icy firmly tied people and citizenship rights to place, so people were born into 
their “class” (Naughton 2007). However, the economic reforms that began 
in 1978 changed the hu\ou system and ushered in a new era.
One of the earliest and most important changes of the reform period was 
the adoption of the Household Contract Responsibility (HCR) system, which 
rearranged agricultural production and allowed peasants to produce for 
profit.2 Peasants had been producing under the commune system, which tied 
their labor to the land, and production was governed by a quota system. This 
changed under the HCR system such that peasants still had a small quota to 
fill, but most of their production was now for the market. This new system 
untied labor from land, giving peasants the freedom to profit from their own 
labor (X. Wu 2005). These changes created surplus labor in the rural areas, 
where 85 percent of the population resided, opening the possibility for new 
migration flows sanctioned by the government through a combination of 
three laws implemented in 1985. First, new regulations permitted farmers 
to move to local towns to start businesses and issued them “self-supplied food 
grain” bulbous. Second, the government issued all citizens identity cards (IDC) 
and allowed them to be used as proof of identification (in lieu of the hu\ou 
passbook issued to each household) (Yusuf and Saich 2008). Finally, the CCP 
created a new huJ^ou status by allowing cities to issue Certificates of Tempo­
rary Residence (zanzhuzheng) to peasants who entered the city for work.3 
Temporary residence status is granted for one year, after which it must be 
renewed (Chan and Zhang 1999). Taken together, these reforms along with 
other changes created the foundation for massive migration within the con­
fines of a reformed hu\ou system. Migration flourished, growing from less 
than 30 million migrant workers in 1980 to about 80 million in 1990 (Liang 
and Ma 2004) to more than 120 million in 2004, reaching approximately 262 
million workers by 2012 (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2012a).
The purpose of the hu\ou system shifted during the reform period.4 It is 
still used to monitor and manage the movement of people (Chan and Zhang 
1999) and as a tool of discipline and control (He 2003; FL. Wang 2004). 
However, it is also used by the state to regulate the economy in new ways 
(F. Cai, Du, and Wang 2003). Furthermore, as the system has evolved it now 
maintains and perpetuates the rural/urban economic disparities created 
under the Maoist-era planned economy by creating a segmented urban labor 
market made up of privileged urban citizens and disadvantaged temporary
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migrant labor (Solinger 1999). As Chan (2009, 204) points out: “W hat is 
unique about migration in China is that the two aspects of internal migra­
tion (movement and citizenship) can be totally disparate; i.e., one can move to 
a new place (for example, because of a job change) but can be permanently 
barred access to community-membership-based services and welfare.”
Hukpu reforms have allowed peasants to migrate into cities while deny­
ing them access to social welfare such as education, health care, and housing 
subsidies. Temporary residents are not granted urban citizenship, nor are 
their children, making it impossible to put down “roots” in the cities. The 
end result is a large pool of cheap, temporary, flexible labor that is an impor­
tant engine of China’s economic growth.
Today, the hukpu system stands as a strong legitimate institution, though 
it continues to undergo reforms that increase its complexity. Specifically, the 
hukpu is becoming localized, which means that local governments are gain­
ing the power to decide what kind of hukpu to grant migrants, which crite­
ria to use to regulate migration, and how many migrants to allow into their 
jurisdiction (Chan and Buckingham 2008). Shifts in national and local reg­
ulations have created internal contradictions in the policies and practices that 
define the relationship between migrants and the state. These contradictions 
are part of what makes hukpu an enduring institution by creating uncertainty 
in current practices while opening opportunity for ongoing change.
Migrants and Citizenship Rights
Hukpu reform created a large new segment of the working class known as 
“peasant workers” or “migrant workers.”5 In 2009, the government estimated 
the total number of migrants to be approximately 230 million, or between 
15 and 17 percent of China’s population. More than half (145 million) are 
interprovincial migrants, meaning they left their home province (NBSC 
2009).6 These migrants are concentrated in larger cities, especially those on 
the East Coast. In Beijing, migrants are estimated to represent about a fourth 
of the city’s population, and cities in Guangdong province, such as Shenzhen, 
often have migrant populations that outnumber locals (Y. Wang 2005). How­
ever, not all migrants are the same.
A person becomes a migrant when he/she leaves the place where he/she 
is registered under the hukpu system. As a result, scholars often discuss two
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broad categories of migrant workers: hukou and non-hukpu migrants 
(K. Chan, Liu, and Yang 1999). Migrants who formally transfer their local 
residency are hukpu migrants; those who do not receive formal residency in 
the host community are called non-hukou migrants.7 For this study, hukpu 
migrants are called permanent migrants, and non-hukpu migrants are di­
vided into two categories based on citizenship rights: special migrants and 
temporary migrants. In addition, the category of temporary migrants includes 
registered and unregistered migrants (see table 2.1 for a summary).
It is difficult to estimate number of migrants in each category or even 
the total number of migrants in China. The estimates are problematic for 
several reasons. First, the definition of migrant varies from study to study. 
Second, surveys often do not include migrants who have been in their host 
location for less than six months. Third, sampling procedures that miss 
unregistered migrants may also result in the underestimation of the overall 
migrant population and of specific subgroups. Fourth, migration policy is 
dynamic, so new statuses for migrants are constantly emerging.
The first type of migrant, permanent migrants, move into the city and 
change both their place of registration and, if still in existence, their hukpu 
status (from agricultural to nonagricultural).8 This group is regulated by pol­
icies dictating requirements for changing one’s status and is subject to quo­
tas. The most common pathways to a status change are through state-owned 
enterprise recruitment, attending a college or university, or promotions within
Table 2.1. Migrants by types and population estimates
T yp es  o f  m ig r a n t E s t im a te d  p o p u la t io n  o f  m ig r a n t  g ro u p
P e r m a n e n t  m ig r a n ts 4 - 1 0  p e rc e n t  o f  to ta l  m ig r a n t  p o p u la t io n  (e s t im a te d  fo r  
1 9 9 0 s ) . R o u g h ly  2 0  m i l l io n  in  2 0 0 7  w i th o u t  m u c h  c h a n g e  
a c ro ss  t im e . ( K .  C h a n  2 0 1 1 )
S p e c ia l {h u kp u )  m ig r a n ts N o  g o o d  e s t im a te s  b e c a u s e  is s u e d  a t  lo c a l le v e l. P ro b a b ly  n o  
m o re  t h a n  10  p e r c e n t  o f  m ig r a n t  p o p u la t io n  a n d  m o s t  
l ik e ly  m u c h  less  b u t  g r o w in g .
T e m p o r a r y  re g is te re d 1 1 4 - 2 8  m i l l io n  in  2 0 0 6 .  ( K .  C h a n  2 0 1 1 )
T e m p o r a r y  u n r e g is te r e d 1 2 %  o f  to ta l  u r b a n  p o p u la t io n  a n d  u p  to  5 0 %  o f  p o p u la t io n  
in  la r g e r  c it ie s  (e s tim a te s  b a s e d  o n  2 0 0 4  [a n d  la te r]  
s ta tis t ic s ) . ( F L .  W a n g  2 0 0 5 ;  C o o k e  2 0 0 8 ;  P. H u a n g  2 0 0 9 )
T o ta l m ig r a n t  w o r k e r s 2 6 2  m i l l io n  ( 2 0 1 2 ) , 2 3 0  m i l l io n  ( N B S C  2 0 0 9 )
